Until the late 1980s the park which was intended as a showcase of modern nature conservation, was little else than dotted lines on the map. There was only a rudimentary park staff and the lack of money and absence of a management plan meant that outside a small area close to the KKH, there was almost no supervision. The status of most of the wildlife was not known but the Marco Polo sheep --the park's most threatened species --was declining at an alarming rate. Poaching had reduced the number of Marco Polo sheep from an estimated 300 in 1975 to about 100 in 1980. The last reliable confirmation was from 1992 when 52 Marco Polo sheep were spotted (WWF 1996:37) . 3 Local villagers, poachers, game wardens, army personnel and Chinese border patrols were all at one point singled out for blame, but no definite proof was ever produced.
Acknowledging the many shortcomings of the management of the KNP, especially the protection of the Marco Polo sheep, the government of Pakistan in collaboration with the IUCN set out to draft a new management plan. In order to assess the situation of wildlife in the park the IUCN asked Wegge to carry out a rapid appraisal and make suggestions for wildlife management. He conducted surveys and wildlife counts at different locations within the park (P. Wegge 1988) and completed the first expert wildlife study since 3. The Marco Polo sheep's core habitat is set aside as the "Kilik-Mintaka Game Reserve" (650 square km) which is contiguous with the Chinese "Taxkorgan Nature Reserve". Marco Polo sheep, snow leopards and blue sheep are known to travel between the reserves. 4. Wegge (1992a: 112) estimated that annual fees from trophy hunting would amount to Rs. 300,000 (US$ 12,500). All currency conversion uses the 1991 value of Pakistani rupees (ca. Rs. 24 = US$ 1).
In the summer of 1989 the newly formed governmental organization, the National Council for Conservation of Wildlife (NCCW), convened a workshop in Gilgit to draft the framework of a new management plan for the KNP (B.Bell 1992) . During the workshop, the Pakistani participants, as well as the invited foreign advisors, ignored Wegge's proposal and declared that their mandate was exclusively to draft a management plan for the original "category II" national park. One reason the participants did not support
Wegge's proposal was that it would strain their relations with the government and downgrade the KNP from a national park to a Biosphere Reserve. This would involve changing the current legislation, and delaying the KNP management proposal (P. Wegge 1990 Wegge , 1992b . 5 The Conservator for Wildlife, Abdul Latif Rao, strongly opposed a revision of the KNP's status:
The [management] plan should be strictly in accordance with the purpose statement, objectives, and recommendations of the workshop which recognize the IUCN definition of a national park. Any attempt to deviate will frustrate the purpose (Rao, quoted in B.Bell 1992:131) .
The minority among the participants asked the government to settle the compensation issue before proceeding with park planning (ibid.:137), but the majority recommended that all grazing should be stopped immediately (ibid.:22) . Only if this strategy proved unsuccessful, should some grazing be allowed in selected areas until a phasing out program could be instituted. As an alternative for those affected, it was suggested that ecotourism and rural development schemes be promoted with the help of the Aga Khan
Rural Support Program, a regional NGO. Apart from Wegge, only a few participants had previous knowledge of the area other than guided tours and excursions in preparation for the workshop.
The aftermath of the Gilgit Workshop
Details of the deliberations at the Gilgit Workshop were not known to the Wakhi villagers, but they soon caught wind of the fact that the new management plans would curtail their customary rights to graze their domestic animals and hunting of wildlife.
Their concern over the new park plans and frustration over not being consulted quickly translated into ad hoc protests (S. Hussein 1994) . Although the Gilgit workshop was not intended to draft a management plan but to prepare "a framework for a management plan" (B.Bell 1992:1), there was growing realization that more information was needed in order to achieve this goal. • 50% of the National Park's annual revenues must be provided to the local people
• business resources created in areas surrounding the National Park must be provided to the local people • nobody will be allowed to do any sort of business or construction work within the National Park, without permission of the local people
• from those [government] institutions which have constructed buildings, payments must be made to the local people
• any institution which wants to perform construction will be liable to pay for the cost of land * The original text uses the term "individual" but the intent is likely to be "household".
Source: Reproduced (with some language editing) from H. Kreutzmann (1995:225) and the original source document (Anonymous 1991) .
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The suggestions made in Ahmad's report were used as a basis for drawing up an agreement with Wakhi villagers in January 1992 (Table 2) . Ahmad --who in the meantime had become Director of Conservation for WWF-Pakistan --was able to negotiate a deal between the seven Wakhi villages along the KKH and representatives of the Northern Areas Administration. Despite the huge discrepancy between the agreement and the demands for compensation set forth in the 1991 declaration (Table 1) , the seven Wakhi Table 2 Excerpt • a maximum of 100 yaks will be allowed in the "core zone" Source: Khunjerab Agreement (1992) . Vol.6 1999 Journal of Political Ecology communities signed the agreement. The only affected community which did not sign was Shimshal. Their main reason for not signing the agreement was that it bans hunting. This would put an end to the hunting of blue sheep and ibex, both important sources of venison during winter months. Moreover, it would outlaw the culling of wild predators, in particular wolves (Canis lupus), hunted with rifles and ancient stone traps. Despite the fact that the agreement relaxes the "no-grazing" clause and allows "traditional concessions of grazing" under certain conditions (Table 2) , the Shimshalis remained sceptical of any interference with their customary herd management. They feared that this was only a first step towards ending the grazing of domestic animals inside the KNP. Unlike the seven Wakhi villages along the KKH, the Shimshalis did not graze animals on the Khunjerab plateau, nor were they willing to trade their customary grazing rights for monetary compensation. For them, economic compensation had never been an issue. It is, therefore, all the more surprising that the other Wakhi villages signed because the agreement does not refer to the compensation issue. One reason why the other Wakhi villagers signed could be the implied use of force. In order to make the Shimshal villagers sign the agreement, in 1991 the government dispatched the district Commissioner to the village. Arriving by helicopter he threatened to imprison the spokesman of the Shimshal villagers, the village headmaster Daulat Amin. Only through an eloquent defence, highlighting the predicament of the village, the importance of their pastoral economy and the villagers' history of loyalty to Pakistan, was the commissioner talked out of taking action against Amin. 7
Collaborative management of the KNP
It is a common problem that "community-based tenurial rights are not recognized by nation states" (O. Lynch and J.Alcorn 1994:376) . A general strategy for resolving this problem is "co-management" (F.Berkes 1991) or "collaborative management" (G. Borrini-Feyerabend 1996) which is currently being explored as a management tool in some national parks (K. Rao and C.Geisler 1991) . The formation of a Management Board (Table 2 ) was a positive step towards the collaborative management of the KNP. However, there are a number of obstacles before this can become a reality. First, the agreement obliges the graziers to forego their right to hunt and to accept restrictions on grazing as well as sudden closures when that is deemed necessary. Secondly, the agreement specifies the size of local recruitment to the park's management but is unclear on whether they would have any real influence on the administration of the park. Thirdly, the affected Wakhi villages were promised seats in the proposed Management Board, but the board was to be chaired by the Administrator of the Northern Areas, the highest authority of the region. The agreement therefore suggests a definite power imbalance in favour of the government.
Shimshal is the only major village in Hunza without a link road to the KKH. The 60 km hike to the village takes two days, and is an exhausting venture through steep granite gorges and across shifting scree slopes, rivers and glaciers. Lacking a road, the village has been left outside the many development changes seen elsewhere in Hunza: there is neither electricity nor mechanized agricultural equipment in the village. To end their isolation villagers began constructing a road themselves in September 1985, aided by a loan from the Aga Khan Rural Support Program. When the money ran out, they hoped that the government would feel obliged to complete it. After some years of standstill, the government contracted the work to local entrepreneurs and road construction was resumed. The road is still not completed. Shimshalis long for an end to their isolation, but there is apprehension that construction of the road will give the local administration an alibi for greater intervention in community affairs and will be used to put pressure on the community to agree to the KNP plans. (Table 3 ). For Shimshal, the KNP plans are therefore especially threatening and as one villager explained it: "If they make it a national park, Shimshal will be a tomb" (A.Knudsen 1992:102) . Another quote underlines the perceived seriousness of the situation: "First they can kill us, then they can come and make it a national park" (Slavin 1991:49 Especially in arid and semi-arid regions, nomadic grazing and transhumance often make the best sustained use of grazing lands; these traditional practices should not be changed without very good reason (R. Dasmann and D.Poore 1979:27) .
The Shimhalis' herd management system would seem to be a typical example of a "traditional practice" and, as confirmed by range surveys, over-grazing was hardly evident (P.Wegge 1988). Brandon and Wells (1992:565) are correct that "there has been a tendency to 'glamorize' ... indigenous resource management practices" but it is dangerous to write them off before their potential role has been established. Moreover, while it is commonly assumed that domestic animals disturb, displace or compete with wildlife, domestic animals in the KNP have helped sustain the large carnivore population and relieved some of the predator pressure on wild ungulates (A.Ahmad 1991:10). 9
The 1992 
The new management plan
The revised management plan for the KNP was presented during an inauguration ceremony in Gilgit in November 1996 (WWF 1996) . The plan is to be commended for trying to solve the complex issues at stake, but falls short of providing new answers to how they can be resolved (Table 4 ). The total operating costs for activities planned under the five-year management plan amount to a staggering Rs. 57 million (ca. US$ 1,5 million) 9. Researchers disagree over this point. Some argue that the size of wildlife populations has been exaggerated and that domestic animals do compete with wild ungulates (WWF 1996: 114, 119 In some respects the new management plan was "too little too late" and elements of the plan had already been pre-empted by the grassroots initiatives of Wakhi villagers. Aided by funding from senior Pakistan People's Party politicians --most prominently former President Farooq Leghari --the "Khunjerab Villagers Organization" (KVO) consisting of the villages along the KKH, has initiated its own conservation program in a 30 km buffer zone outside the KNP's border (Z. Khan 1996) . Similarly, Shimshal villagers have formed their own "Shimshal Nature Trust" which aims to protect the environment and preserve biodiversity. 13 Neither of these initiatives has been welcomed by the authorities and there is local resentment that "the big environment NGOs which were on the scene when .. [we] ..
12. Some have speculated that Shimshalis are hunting large predators to extinction in order to erode the foundation of the park (WWF 1996:116) . No evidence has been produced to confirm this charge. 13. The management plan of the "Shimshal Nature Trust" is available on the internet (Online) as is the "Shimshal Natural Resources Program" (Online). As a corollary of this plan, Shimshalis have reduced their own hunting of ibex and blue sheep but are skeptical of allowing trophy hunting by foreigners (Inayatullah Ali, pers.comm., June 1999).
were against conservation have jilted us after we took matters in our own hands" (ibid.:142). Villagers believe they should have a say in the management of the KNP and suspect that the plans will enrich the government at their expense. According to Qurban
Mohammed, spokesman for the KVO, Wakhi villagers are:
"interested in developing the Khunjerab National Park, but the management of the park should be in local hands. The government will take the profit without involving the people. They just want to take all this beautiful land away and leave us empty-handed" (Q.Mohammed, quoted in T.Slavin 1991:49).
The lack of trust between Wakhi villagers and the government has so far made collaborative management of the KNP impossible. In order to protest the police checkpoint put up by the para-military Khunjerab Security Force (KSF) in 1991, the KVO erected its own "people's" (awami) checkpost just north of the one maintained by the KSF. 14 The stationing of the KSF in the park increases Wakhi villagers feeling of being under siege. The KSF's principal mission is to guard national security interests at the Chinese border but it is also the de facto authority of the KNP. Park regulations ban carrying weapons inside the KNP but this does not apply to the KSF. 15 Being both better organized and armed enables the KSF to "exercise more control over park resources than KNP staff ... Consequently, park rules and administration are relegated to a secondary position" (WWF 1996:44-45) . The plan suggests vesting formal park authority with the KNP administration but there is in reality no short-term administrative solution to the problem.
The Central Karakoram National Park
The Whereas local people were consulted, there were no concrete discussions of how the CKNP should be managed, nor was co-management discussed as a management option.
The park plans involved imposing a hunting ban throughout the park but the implications for animal husbandry were not discussed. The workshop was not short of expert advice on the people and the region but only a few of the invited researchers had been solicited for advice. However, in order to gain a better basis for evaluating the potential for trekking tourism, the IUCN later commissioned a study of ecotourism in the Northern Areas under its Biodiversity Project (J. Mock and K.O'Neil 1996) . Pakistan is currently seeking a "World Heritage Site" nomination for the CKNP. There are a obstacles to this nomination, especially the extensive armed forces deployment in the area and the dispute over jurisdiction between Pakistan and India (the "Kashmir conflict").
Changing perceptions of national parks
There is a growing realization that national parks, as traditionally conceived, are ill- While land-use zoning was previously seen as a way to accommodate the need of different user groups with wildlife protection, recent studies are less optimistic that the zoning principle can achieve multiple-use in national parks (M.Colchester 1994:31) . In particular,
"it may be difficult to convince local people that restricted buffer-zone access is a valuable benefit if (a) they had unrestricted use of the area before establishment of the protected area; or (b) many of the resources of the proposed buffer-zone area had already been degraded or depleted --both common situations on park boundaries" (M.Wells 1992:240).
In order for people to value conservation they must be secured income from resources which supported them in the past and be allowed to earn supplemental income. Currently, ecotourism is advocated as the most promising avenue for creating alternative employment for resident populations. A general problem with ecotourism is that most of the profits are not realized locally, but pocketed by national and international tour operators (K. Brandon and M.Wells 1992:36; M.Colchester 1994:33) . The amount of money earned locally tends to be low and locals are left with the negative impacts of modern ecotourism, which, despite its appealing name, is not always "environment friendly". A major problem in the high mountains of Northern Pakistan is the firewood requirements of foreign expeditions and trekking tourists which put heavy pressure on the sparse forest cover. Another problem is campsite-specific impacts such as garbage dumps and human waste (S.Rashid 1994).
In the late 1980s, a new conservation "paradigm" emerged which stressed the need for nature conservation to become more profitable as well as better accounting for the loss of biodiversity. This "pragmatic" approach to nature conservation led to the foundation of community-based trophy-hunting programs, giving economic benefit to local communities. Despite increasing criticism of such programs in East and Southern Africa (C. Gibson and S.Marks 1995) , trophy-hunting has been promoted as the only viable strategy for wildlife management in Pakistan because "a complete ban on hunting, which in theory sounds fantastic, is severely counter-productive in reality. It is logistically impossible for the government to enforce it" (Durrani, quoted in S.Mallick 1994) . This approach has gradually gained acceptance and both IUCN and WWF now run communitybased trophy-hunting programs in the Northern Areas (A.Nasar 1995; Z. Khan 1996) .
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The willingness of the IUCN and WWF to initiate participatory conservation projects is in stark opposition to the confrontational stance adopted in the KNP. 18. Recent examples of such programs can be found in the IUCN Progress Report (IUCN 1999 ) and the ibex conservation plan for Hushey Village Organization (HVO 1997) .
assuming that it continues to follow the internationally recognized norms for a national park. It is clear from this workshop that the Government of Pakistan has this firm intention. Nothing should be allowed to deflect from this admirable resolve (Sale, quoted in B.Bell 1992:133) .
Despite the changes which had taken place in the IUCN's conservation policy the organization endorsed the category II designation and made this mandatory for continued support of the park planning process. Moreover, the IUCN ignored advice from Wegge, the organization's own consultant and the most knowledgeable person on the status of wildlife in the KNP. costs to the government have also be considerable, leading them to declare that they "had no desire to repeat this experience, and ... adopted a participatory model for its recent initiative for a Central Karakoram National Park" (SPCS 1996:164) . The planning process for the CKNP confirms that the government is seeking to avoid past mistakes. However, whereas local villagers were under certain conditions supportive of the park plans, the Pakistani authorities have neither decided how to tackle demands for economic compensation nor accommodated existing land-use practices within the guidelines of a category II national park.
In the KNP, the government implemented an outdated conservation model (the "Yellowstone model"), despite the fact that it been replaced by more sensitive conservation measures. Moreover, the IUCN actively supported this strategy long after it was clear that it was doomed to failure. This criticism also applies to the governmental wildlife agency, the NCCW, which was adamant that the only management option for the KNP was the category II designation. At the same time, this case study illustrates some of 
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This paper discusses recent conservation efforts in Northern Pakistan and the relevance of national parks as legal instruments in nature and wildlife conservation. Employing an extensive case-study approach the paper analyzes the problems afflicting the Khunjerab National Park and discusses why the World Conservation Union (IUCN) disregarded its own policy guidelines for mountain protected areas. The paper advocates a more democratic and pragmatic approach to nature conservation and argues that national parks as traditionally conceived impose heavy burdens on local people. Despite increasing criticism of national parks, they continue to be implemented often for no other reason than the high conservationist profile this alternative offers.
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Resumé
Ce document met en exergue les efforts récents de conservation au nord du Pakistan et l'importance des parks nationaux comme instruments légaux pour la preservation de la nature. En se basant sur une approche qui s'appuie sur un cas d'étude, l'auteur analyse les problèmes auxquels le Park National de Khunjerab est confronté et explique les raisons pour lesquelles l'Union Mondiale pour la Conservation a ignoré ses propres orientations politiques pour la protection des zones montagneuses. L'auteur suggère une approche plus democratique et pragmatique pour la conservation de la nature et défend l'argument selon lequel la conception tradionnelle des parks nationaux constitue une grande pesanteur sur les populations locales. En dépit des critiques croissantes des parks nationaux, ceux-ci continuent à être implementés sans autre raison que celle de mettre en evidence le profil élevé de cetter démarche conservationiste.
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Resumen
Este artículo discute los esfurerzos más recientes de conservación en el Norte de Pakistan, y la aplicabilidad de parques nacionales como instrumentos de conservación de fauna y de la naturaleza. Usando un metódo vasto de estudio de casos, esta obra analiza los problemas que el parque nacional de Khunjerab esta enfrentando y habla de porqué el World Conservation Union (la unión de conservación mundial) ignoró sus propias normas y guías para la protección de áreas montañosas. El artículo aboga por una meta más democrática y pragmática para la conservación de la naturaleza, y discute como el concepto tradicional de los parques nacionales impone cargos pesados en la gente local. Aunque hay una creciente crítica de los parques nacionales, ellos continuan siendo implementados en muchas ocasiones por no otra razón más de ser la única alternativa que ofrece de mostrar un perfil politico de ser conservacionista. Palabres claves : Pakistan, parques nacionales, conservación de fauna y de la naturaleza, el parque nacional de Khunjerab, la gente local, Karakoram.
